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Calibration is needed to scale actions appropriately. Earlier studies suggested that cal-
ibration transfers to actions that serve the same goal (Rieser, Pick, Ashmead, &
Garing, 1995). This experiment further tested this functional hypothesis by asking
whether the calibration of walking transfers to crawling. To recalibrate walking, par-
ticipants walked on a treadmill for 15 min in a virtual environment in which the vi-
sual speed was faster than, equal to, or slower than the walking speed. After each of
these rearrangement phases, the participants had to walk or crawl to a seen place
without vision. The distance locomoted showed that the calibration of walking gen-
eralized to crawling, which supports the functional hypothesis. It is suggested that ac-
tion systems are calibrated.
Movements must be appropriately scaled to the environment for behavior to be
successful. Calibration contributes to the establishment and maintenance of such
scaling (e.g., Adolph & Avolio, 2000; Bingham, Zaal, Robin, & Shull, 2000; Mark,
ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY, 14(4), 223–234
Copyright © 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Rob Withagen, Faculteit der Bewegingswetenschappen, Vrije
Universiteit, van der Boechorststraat 9, 1081 BT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: R.Withagen@
fbw.vu.nl
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
7:
48
 4
 A
pr
il
 2
01
1
1987). We take the calibration of action to bear on the relation between informa-
tion guiding a movement and the movement itself. Calibration is thereby to be dis-
tinguished from perceptual learning, or what Gibson (1966) called the education of
attention, the process by which perceptual systems converge on the perceptual vari-
able that specifies the to-be-perceived or to-be-acted upon property (e.g., see
Jacobs, Michaels, & Runeson, 2000; Michaels & de Vries, 1998; Runeson, Juslin,
& Olsson, 2000).
Calibration is presumably a continual process (e.g., see Bingham et al., 2000)
and is explicitly required in situations that require an information–action relation
to be adjusted for the action to be successful. This can be a task in which the per-
ceptual consequences of actions are altered, for example, walking on a moving
sidewalk or doing surgery while looking through a microscope. It can also be a situ-
ation in which the action capabilities of the animal, known as effectivities (Shaw &
Turvey, 1981) change, but the change is not specified by the perceptual variable
the animal exploits. Mark (1987), for instance, suggested that the information
about the sit-on-ability and climb-on-ability is scaled to eye-height, rendering it
necessary for the perceptual system to recalibrate when the leg length increases.
At present, there is no fully fledged theory of the calibration in perception–ac-
tion. An important precursor to such a theory is establishing what is calibrated. A
discovery in calibration research that is of interest in this regard is that calibration
seems to transfer in a functionally specific way. Rieser, Pick, Ashmead, and Garing
(1995) presented walkers with a discrepancy between their walking speed and the
optically specified environmental speed, and found that after this “rearrangement
phase” participants walked too far or not far enough, depending on rearrangement
type, when asked to walk to a seen place without vision. Not only was walking
recalibrated, but also sidestepping. The calibration, however, did not transfer ei-
ther to throwing to a place or to turning in place. When, on the other hand, throw-
ing to a place or turning in place was recalibrated, no transfer to walking was found.
Hence, it seems that calibrations are functionally organized. This led Rieser et al.
to propose a functional model of perception–action organization. This model holds
that the calibration of an action transfers to actions that serve the same goal and
have the same perceptual consequences. Rieser et al. added the criterion of actions
having the same perceptual consequences because they believed that in the rear-
rangement phase the participant discovered the new covariation between the ac-
tion and its perceptual consequences, and acted upon this in the posttest. Rieser et
al. were, however, not specific about perceptual consequences, so it is hard to use
this criterion to make predictions.
Recently, Bruggeman, Pick, and Rieser (2001) provided further evidence for
this functional organization of calibration. They showed that when participants sit-
ting on a turning carousel were asked to throw beanbags underhand to the opposite
side of the carousel, the directional recalibration was seen not only with underhand
throwing, but also with overhand throwing. Walking direction, however, was not
recalibrated.
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We know of no other studies addressing the functional model, so one of the
goals of our article is to further test the transfer of calibration in a new task. Sec-
ond, in the paradigms used to date, the transfer of calibration was always to an
action performed by the same limbs as the calibrated action. If calibrations are
functionally organized, there should also be a transfer of calibration to an en-
tirely different coordinative movement pattern that involves other limbs but
that, nevertheless, executes the same function. In the experiment reported here,
the hypothesis of transfer to a different coordinative pattern serving the same
function is tested. We asked whether there is a transfer of calibration from walk-
ing to crawling on one’s hands and knees. Both actions serve the function of get-
ting to a place, and, thus, the functional model would predict a transfer of cali-
bration.
To test whether the calibration of walking to a place transfers to crawling to a
place, we used a design in which a rearrangement phase was followed by a posttest.
In the test phase, the participants were asked to walk or crawl to a seen place with-
out vision. The rearrangement phase consisted of a situation in which there was a
discrepancy between visually and biomechanically (proprioceptively) specified
walking speeds. This was expected to induce a recalibration of the biomechanical
activity and the optically specified distance walked (cf. Rieser et al., 1995). So, if
the walking speed is faster than the environmental speed, the participants should
walk too far during the posttest, and if the walking speed is less than the environ-
mental speed, the participants should not walk far enough during the posttest. If
such overshoots and undershoots occur in crawling as well as in walking, this would
mean that the calibration of walking transfers to crawling.
Rieser et al. (1995) contrived the discrepancy between the walking speed and
the optically specified speed by having people walk on a treadmill that was towed
by a tractor. An alternative is to create such a discrepancy with simulated optics in
virtual reality. The reason for using a virtual reality, in our case a Cave Automated
Virtual Environment (CAVE), instead of a real environment, was twofold. First,
we used a virtual environment because creating a discrepancy between the opti-
cally and biomechanically specified walking speeds is obviously easier in a virtual
environment than in a real one. Second, we were interested in whether the CAVE
is an effective research tool to study the calibration of action. The CAVE has
proven to be a moderately, although not unequivocally, successful tool to study
certain interceptive actions (Zaal & Michaels, in press).
METHOD
Participants
Six men and 6 women were paid a small fee for their participation in the experi-
ment. The participants ranged from 19 to 30 years of age. All had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision and were not told of the goal of the experiment.
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Apparatus
To create a discrepancy between the walking and environmental speeds, an electric
treadmill (Walker G64, which has a moving surface of 109 × 34 cm) was placed in
the CAVE situated at SARA (Academic Computing Services Amsterdam) in Am-
sterdam. The CAVE is a three-dimensional virtual environment that consists of
three walls and a floor (each approximately 3 × 3 m). The treadmill was positioned
so that the participant was in the middle of the CAVE. The visually specified for-
ward motion was created by moving a point of observation through one of the
CAVE’s virtual environments, the Grand Place of Brussels. Presentation was ste-
reoscopic; that is, on each of the four projection surfaces (three walls and the
floor), images intended for the right and left eyes were projected in alternation.
The perceiver wore liquid crystal glasses; the left and right lenses were opened in
synchrony with the projected images. The viewing angle of the glasses was 87°.
This simulation was computed from photographs of the Place. The virtual environ-
ment was elevated such that its ground was specified to be the same height as the
treadmill’s moving surface. In our judgment, the simulation yielded a compelling
sense of moving through a visual environment at a specific rate.
Design and Procedure
The experiment consisted of a control test and three rearrangement phases, each
followed by a posttest. Prior to the control test, there was a short warm-up in which
the participant tried to walk and to crawl to seen points without vision. When the
participant built some confidence in doing this, we started with the control test,
the details of which were identical to the posttest, described below.
In each rearrangement phase, the participants walked on the treadmill for a pe-
riod of 15 min; they held onto its rail and were asked to pay attention to the sur-
roundings. They walked in a straight line on the treadmill, but the visual input in-
dicated that they walked ellipses with a long axis of 91 m and a short axis of 39 m in
a counterclockwise direction. The three rearrangement phases comprised a bio-
mechanically slower condition (walking speed of 3 km/hr, environmental speed of
13 km/hr); an equal condition (walking and environmental speed of 3 km/hr); and
a biomechanically faster condition (walking speed of 6 km/hr, environmental speed
of 3 km/hr). Immediately after the rearrangement phase, the participants covered
their eyes with opaque goggles, and were guided by an experimenter to the first
starting point of the posttest.
Each test phase (control or posttest) consisted of six walks and six crawls. An
experimenter indicated with the tip of his right foot the target to which the partici-
pant was to locomote. The participants, standing or on all fours, were asked to view
the target, cover their eyes with opaque goggles, and walk or crawl to the target
over a carpeted surface. The participants were told that the tester would move as
they started their approach so that the path would be clear. In the walking condi-
tion, they were instructed to place the tip of their left foot at the target; in the
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crawling condition, the tip of their left middle finger was to be placed at the target.
Participants wore gloves to prevent them from feeling the starting points and the
target, which were marked by tape. In addition, they wore earplugs to reduce any
acoustic information that might be available about locations. They were also
equipped with kneepads to reduce discomfort caused by crawling. Because it was
hard to put the kneepads on and take them off, they were worn during the whole
experiment.
For each trial, we measured the distance from the starting point to the stopping
point, as well as the lateral distance between the stopping point and the straight
line from the starting point to the target. Because the participants were neither to
be aware of their performance nor to receive any visual information while being
tested, they were guided from the stopping point to the next starting point by the
experimenter. To ensure that it was a perceptual rather than a memory task, differ-
ent target distances were used. There were three target distances for the walks (6.5,
6.0, 5.5 m) and three for the crawls (3.0, 4.0, 5.0 m). The target distances for the
crawls were shorter, again, to reduce any discomfort caused by crawling. Blocks of
three crawls were alternated with blocks of three walks. Within each of the blocks,
the order of the three target distances was randomized. After each test phase there
was a 5-min break.
Half of the participants started with the biomechanically slower condition, fol-
lowed by the equal condition, followed by the biomechanically faster condition; the
other half started with the biomechanically faster condition, followed by the equal
condition, followed by the biomechanically slower condition. Within each of these
groups, half of the participants started each posttest with crawls, and the other half
startedwithwalks.Theparticipantswereexplicitlyaskednot tocounttheir steps.
RESULTS
Because different distances were walked and crawled on different trials, we com-
puted the percentage overshoot and undershoot for each trial. We did this by sub-
tracting the target distance from the actual distance locomoted and dividing by the
target distance. Overshoots were thereby positive, and undershoots negative.
We looked first at the control test to examine how the participants were initially
calibrated. The first line of Table 1 shows that there was a slight overshoot in both
the walks and the crawls and that the variability was high.
The second through fourth lines of Table 1 present measures that should indi-
cate whether there were recalibration effects in the walks and the crawls. The di-
rection of these effects were as predicted; the higher the ratio of biomechanical
speed to visual speed, the further the locomotion. To determine whether the recali-
bration effects were significant, we performed a repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) on the signed distance error as a percentage of target distance,
with rearrangement type (faster, equal, slower), task (walk, crawl), and trial as
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within factors. We found a significant main effect of rearrangement type, F(2, 22)
= 3.861, p < .05, showing that the degree of target overshoot depended on condi-
tion. A post-hoc test (Tukey–Kramer) showed that participants locomoted signifi-
cantly farther (an average of 5.5%) in the biomechanically faster condition than in
the biomechanically slower condition.
The ANOVA also revealed that the overshoot was significantly greater (average
of6.4%) inwalking than incrawling,F(1,22)=9.256,p<.05, showing thatonaver-
age the walks were calibrated differently from the crawls. There was no significant
main effect of trial, nor were there significant interaction effects. The absence of a
significant interaction effect between task and rearrangement type, F(2, 22) =
0.3347,p>.10, suggests that therewerenodifferences incalibrationeffectsbetween
walking and crawling. Unfortunately, the low power of the statistical test (.206)
makes this interpretation tentative. As a further test of whether both walking and
crawling were calibrated, we performed separate repeated measures ANOVAs on
the walks and on the crawls, with rearrangement type (faster, equal, slower) as a
within factor. We found significant main effects of rearrangement type both for the
walks, F(2, 142) = 16.006, p < .001, and for the crawls, F(2, 142) = 4.637, p < .05.
Post-hoctests (Tukey–Kramer) showedthatparticipantswalkedsignificantly farther
in the biomechanically faster condition than in the equal and the biomechanically
slower condition, and crawled significantly farther in the biomechanically faster
condition than in the biomechanically slower condition (see Figure 1). On the basis
of this additional evidence, we conclude that both walking and crawling were
recalibrated and, thus, that the calibration of walking transfers to crawling.1
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TABLE 1
The Average Signed Distance Errors as a Percentage of Target Distance
for the Control Test and the Three Rearrangement Types
Activity
Walk Crawl
M SD M SD
Control 4.9 7.6 2.1 10.2
Biomechanically faster 13.0 10.6 4.9 9.5
Equal 8.7 10.7 4.0 14.1
Biomechanically slower 6.7 10.2 0.3 10.5
1Because the visual input specified that the participants walked ellipses through the simulated envi-
ronment, there was also a discrepancy between the optically and biomechanically specified walking di-
rection. One might also expect this discrepancy to lead to a directional recalibration of locomotion; that
is, a recalibration in the angle diverged from the straight line from the starting point to the target.
Recalibration, if it occurs, is to be expected not only between the control test and the recalibration
phases, but also between the recalibration phases because of the different ratios of biomechanical to vi-
sual speeds. We computed the angles at which the participants diverged from the straight line from the
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Table 2 presents results for individual participants; the data have been aver-
aged over trials. These scores provide a more detailed picture of the inter-
participant variation both in the relative sizes of the calibration effects in the
crawls and walks and in the differences between the rearrangement types for the
walks and crawls.
DISCUSSION
Calibration helps scale action and perception appropriately to the environment.
Earlier studies (Bruggeman et al., 2001; Rieser et al., 1995) suggested that calibra-
tions are functionally organized; that is, if an action is calibrated, other actions that
serve the same goal are calibrated as well. This experiment further investigated this
theory. We asked participants to walk on a treadmill in a virtual environment,
where the treadmill speed and optically specified speed were sometimes different.
Following this recalibration procedure, they had to walk or crawl to seen targets
without vision. We asked whether walking was recalibrated and, if so, whether the
calibration of walking to a place transferred to crawling to a place. We found both
recalibration of walking and transfer to crawling. Thus, overall, the results provide
further support for the functional hypothesis.
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FIGURE 1 The average signed distance errors as a percentage of target distance for each trial
of the three rearrangement types. The left figure depicts the walks, and the right figure depicts
the crawls.
starting point to the target. A repeated measures ANOVA on the these angles, with rearrangement type
(control, faster, equal, slower), task (walk, crawl), and trial as within factors, revealed only a main effect
of trial, F(5, 20) = 2.686, p < .05. The fact that there were no other main effects or interaction effects
(ps > .1) indicates that there was no directional recalibration of locomotion. Note that the angular dis-
crepancy varies dramatically over the ellipse; the point of observation is moving almost linearly in the
middle of the long sides, but is quite curved on the short sides. Thus, this design does not provide a
strong test of directional recalibration or its transfer.
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Is the CAVE an Appropriate Tool to Establish
Recalibration of Walking?
The differences in overshoot between the three ratios of optically specified speed
and the actual walking speed suggest that the virtual environment created by the
CAVE is an effective tool to induce recalibration effects. But are there alternative
explanations of the overshoots we observed? One might hypothesize that the ef-
fects are aftereffects of biomechanical activity, as has been reported by Anstis
(1995). After all, the participants walked further in the faster condition than in the
slower and equal conditions, and the walking speed in the former condition was 3
km/h faster than in the latter two. We believe that this hypothesis can be elimi-
nated on the basis of the study by Rieser et al. (1995), which showed that the over-
shoot in walking to a seen place after walking on a treadmill is not due to the
biomechanical activity alone. In one of their experiments, participants were to
walk on a stationary treadmill with their eyes either closed or open. An overshoot
was found in the eyes open condition, but not in the eyes closed condition, showing
that the overshoot is not an aftereffect of the biomechanical activity but is due to
the discrepancy between the biomechanical and visual speeds. On the basis of this
result, we concluded that the effects in the walks and the transfer to the crawls
were due to a perceptual-motor calibration.
For the CAVE to be deemed a good research tool to study recalibration, how-
ever, it must also be the case that the perceptual-motor calibration is the result of
the discrepancies between the walking and environmental speeds contrived in the
230 WITHAGEN AND MICHAELS
TABLE 2
The Average Signed Distance Errors as a Percentage of Target Distance
for Each Participant for the Control Test and the Three Rearrangement Types
Activity
Walk Crawl
Participant Control
Biomechanically
Faster Equal
Biomechanically
Slower Control
Biomechanically
Faster Equal
Biomechanically
Slower
1 8.2 20.5 15.3 7.1 –8.7 1.6 31.6 4.4
2 8.2 7.9 4.3 –2.5 17.1 6.0 –7.7 –7.1
3 3.7 13.7 5.6 6.4 4.4 4.4 2.0 –0.6
4 –1.0 2.7 –0.4 1.4 –4.3 –5.7 –7.3 –5.4
5 1.9 11.2 9.4 0.3 –2.0 2.0 –2.7 –9.7
6 12.2 29.3 22.6 25.7 6.7 18.0 9.9 8.3
7 14.1 9.8 11.2 15.4 4.8 10.2 7.7 12.4
8 9.6 12.0 –0.6 2.4 –3.8 –9.2 –12.3 –14.3
9 –2.7 1.7 –2.2 4.3 0.7 1.0 0.1 7.2
10 –3.9 2.4 0.2 –3.7 6.3 11.1 11.0 3.0
11 5.4 26.9 22.8 4.7 –2.2 9.2 7.7 –6.9
12 2.5 17.5 15.8 18.7 5.7 9.9 8.7 11.8
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CAVE. The alternative is that participants perceived the stationary screen on
which the street scene was projected or the pixel structure of the images, and that
the differences in walking speeds between the conditions caused the recalibration
effects to a stationary environment. As Rieser et al. (1995) showed, a percep-
tual-motor calibration can also be established if the optically specified environ-
mental speed is zero. Assuming that the overshoots in walking to a seen place with-
out vision are greater if the walking speed is faster, this might also account for the
differences between the faster condition (walking speed of 6 km/h) and the slower
and equal conditions (3 km/h in both conditions), and the absence of difference
between the slower and equal conditions. Relatedly, this hypothesis is consistent
with the absence of an undershoot in the biomechanically slower condition. How-
ever, we know of no evidence that perceivers can ignore the optic flow in a CAVE.
In any case, further tests are needed to establish with certainty that the calibration
effects were in fact affected by the different optical speeds.
On What Is Calibrated
What do transfer studies tell us about what is calibrated? The results to date appear
to allow rejection of one characterization of calibration: the thesis that calibration
is effector specific (e.g., see Anstis, 1995). The effector-specific thesis claims that in
a situation that requires an action to be recalibrated, the calibration is specific to
the effector by which the action is performed. Thus, according to this hypothesis,
any action performed with the same effector should also show the consequences of
the calibration. This thesis can explain the transfer from the calibration of walking
to side stepping (Rieser et al., 1995), from the calibration of underhand throwing to
overhand throwing (Bruggeman et al., 2001), and might even explain the transfer
of calibration from walking to crawling, because the legs also play an important role
in the latter (e.g., see Adolph, Vereijken, & Denny, 1998). Two findings are, how-
ever, inconsistent with this thesis: The calibration of walking did not transfer to
turning in place and vice versa (Rieser et al., 1995). Therefore, it seems, calibration
is not specific to effectors.
Instead, calibration appears to relate to functions, rather than to specific
effectors. In the remainder of this article, we attempt to elaborate the functional
model of Rieser et al. (1995). In particular, we explore the possibility that action
systems are calibrated.
Are Action Systems Calibrated?
A theory of the calibration of action systems can be derived from Reed’s (1982,
1988, 1996) concept of action systems. Reed argued that theories of motor systems
do not have the potential of explaining the goal-directed activity of animals in their
environments. Reed was inspired, first, by Gibson’s (1966, 1979) theory of percep-
tual systems, which claimed that the detection of information entailed systems
TRANSFER OF CALIBRATION 231
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larger and more diverse than the senses as classically conceived. A second inspira-
tion was the Russian action theorists (e.g., Bernstein, 1967; Luria, 1973), who de-
veloped the concept of functional system. Following Bernstein, Reed argued that
animals are in a disequilibrium with their environments and therefore act continu-
ally so as to meet their goals and needs. Actions, Reed asserted, are not triggered by
stimuli or commands from the brain, as motor theorists might hold, but are regu-
lated by perceptual information existing in the ambient array, which specifies both
what the animal can do and how it can do it. Only by picking up such information
can animals act adaptively in the environment.
Reed (1982, 1996) argued that in the course of evolution, selection pressures
have given rise to systems that are each capable of performing a function. He
termed these action systems. An action system should not be thought of as a specific
collection of anatomical units that performs a particular function; instead, a char-
acteristic of an action system is that it can accomplish its function by several
means. For instance, the locomotion system of a human being, which performs the
function of getting to a place, can perform its function by walking, crawling, side
stepping, and so on. An action system is characterized by what Luria (1973) called
a “mobility of its component parts” (p. 27): The task and the final result stay the
same, but the way the function is performed and, thus, the anatomical parts in-
volved may vary.
A theory of the calibration of action systems would hold that in a situation that
requires actions to be rescaled, it is not the action that is calibrated, but the system
that is capable of reaching the intended goal, the action system. Because an action
system is capable of performing a function by several means, all such means are
rescaled if the action system is calibrated. As an aside, note that the concept trans-
fer of calibration would no longer be appropriate in this theory; transfer implies that
one action is calibrated and that this calibration spreads out to other actions. If ac-
tion systems are calibrated, then the calibration applies to (rather than transfers to)
the various distinguishable ways of executing the function, such as walking or
crawling.
The idea of the calibration of action systems predicts that if an action system is
calibrated, all the means by which it can perform the function are rescaled. How-
ever, this idea requires elaboration on several fronts before it can make testable pre-
dictions. To make testable predictions, one must be able to enumerate the action
systems that constitute an animal’s behavioral repertoire, but at present, there are
no unambiguous principles for doing so. Reed’s (1982) claim that action systems
are “the results of parallel or convergent evolution” (p. 113) does not suffice as a
criterion to distinguish the systems, and the taxonomy he offered in his articles
(1982, 1988) and book (1996) is, as he himself acknowledged, “provisional” (Reed,
1982, p. 114).
It is not clear what criteria should be used to distinguish the action systems.
Here lies a potential role for calibration. It may be that transfer studies can be used
to provide the taxonomy of action systems: One investigates actions to which a cal-
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ibration applies and tries to reveal what the action system is on the basis of the re-
sults. Such a strategy, of course, precludes testing whether action systems are cali-
brated; it assumes that action systems exist and are calibrated independently. The
results to date suggest, however, that this is a reasonable assumption. The finding
that if walking to a place is recalibrated, crawling and side stepping are recalibrated
as well, but throwing and turning in place are not, suggests that human beings have
a locomotion system that can be calibrated. Such a system is presumably the kind
of system Reed had in mind: It performs an evolutionarily important function and
is able to achieve this function by several means. If further transfer studies reveal
other such systems, the recalibration methodology may turn out to be a proper
means by which the taxonomy of action systems can be established. Even though
using transfer studies to distinguish the action systems renders the hypothesis that
action systems are calibrated untestable, that strategy may further the understand-
ing of the nature of action systems and yield hypotheses about calibration that are
testable in other paradigms.
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